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INTRODUCTION

When a person fails to protect a child in her custody from
sexual abuse, should she be civilly liable to that child? She did not
cause the harm. She did not increase the harm. She did not
prevent others from discovering the harm. She simply did nothing.
That was the problem the Minnesota Supreme Court faced in
1
Suzette Johnson took fourteen-year-old Aja
Bjerke v. Johnson.
2
Bjerke into her home. Bjerke entered into a sexual relationship
3
with Johnson’s live-in boyfriend. Johnson did not protect Bjerke
4
from the harm caused by that relationship. A negligence claim
ensued, and the court had to decide whether a special relationship
existed between Johnson and Bjerke giving rise to a duty to
5
protect. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that such a duty
existed, affirming the appellate court’s decision, though on a
6
different legal theory.
This case note first outlines the history of duty in negligence
and, particularly, the history of liability for nonfeasance where the
7
It outlines how special
defendant did not cause the harm.
relationships became one of the few avenues to liability for
nonfeasance and discusses the special relationships laid out in the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 666 (holding a special relationship existed under the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)). The court of appeals had rejected use of
section 314A and found a special relationship under section 324A. Bjerke v.
Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 742
N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).
7. See infra Part II.A–C.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts. The note then discusses the history of
9
special relationships in Minnesota law. Next, the note describes
the facts and the supreme court’s analysis of the Bjerke v. Johnson
case, focusing on how the court applied the Restatement (Second)
10
section 314A(4) to establish a special relationship. The note then
argues that the Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota compared with the majority of
11
other states. The note also argues, however, that the decision is
solidly grounded in the supreme court’s prior holdings on special
12
relationships in Minnesota. The note then identifies outstanding
questions with regard to the relationship between the custodian of
the child and the child’s parents, the resolution of which will either
13
expand or contract the reach of the Bjerke decision in future cases.
Finally, the note concludes that the decision is consistent with the
nonfeasance liability trends identified and predicted by
commentators and reflected in the latest draft of the Restatement
14
(Third) of Torts.
II. HISTORY: NEGLIGENCE, DUTY, AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. Origins of Negligence
Negligence as a distinct tort developed relatively recently. It
15
began to appear around the start of the nineteenth century as an
action against a person who engaged in a “public” or “common”
16
calling. Innkeepers, surgeons, barbers, smiths, and ferrymen were
the defendants in what are recognized as the earliest negligence

8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part II.E.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.A-B.
12. See infra Part IV.C.
13. See infra Part IV.D.
14. See infra Part IV.E.
15. FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 152 (1933); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 28, at 160 (5th ed. 1984).
The rise of negligence has been attributed to the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution. Id. at 161 n.9. “Perhaps one of the chief agencies in the growth of the
idea is industrial machinery. Early railway trains, in particular, were notable
neither for speed nor for safety. They killed any object from a Minister of State to
a wandering cow, and this naturally reacted on the law.” Id. (quoting Winfield,
The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REV. 184, 195 (1926)).
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 28, at 161.
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17

cases. The theory was that people in these trades held themselves
out to the public to be competent and thus assumed an obligation
18
to do their work properly. Essentially, negligence required that
the defendant had “formally undertaken to do something which
19
the common law required him to do reasonably well.”
The essence of liability for those in common callings arose
from the “beneficial nature of the relationship” they had with those
20
There existed an
who required and paid for their services.
21
entrustment, a burden in exchange for a benefit, and therefore a
certain level of care was required.
As the law evolved, the number of relationships which
demanded some level of care expanded. The law began to require
not only that a person perform an affirmative undertaking
properly, but under some circumstances, that a person act to avoid
22
danger or prevent harm to another without a clear undertaking.
Yet throughout this expansion, the concept of a voluntary
undertaking remained present.
As negligence common law
progressed, questions of negligence began to fall into one of two
23
categories:
misfeasance
(malfeasance)
or
nonfeasance.
Misfeasance exists when a person undertakes an activity and fails to
24
Nonfeasance occurs
proceed so as to avoid harm to another.
when a person fails to protect another or prevent harm to another
17. HARPER, supra note 15, § 66, at 153.
18. Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 28 at 161.
19. HARPER, supra note 15, § 66, at 153. Justice Cardozo famously stated that
“[I]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously,
may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.”
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922).
20. HARPER, supra note 15, § 66, at 153.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 153-54. For example: “[I]f one erected a building upon his land, he
was at once in a more or less definite relationship with others, tenants, guests,
persons on and owners of adjoining lands, a relationship that became the basis of
definite obligations to avoid harm to others from his property.” Id. at 154.
23. These terms are also referred to as “commission” and “omission” or
“action” and “inaction.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 373.
24. Id. at 374. Misfeasance is “misconduct working positive injury to others,”
where the defendant has somehow created the risk to the plaintiff. Id. at 373.
Therefore: “[I]f a force is within the actor’s control, his failure to control it is
treated as though he were actively directing it and not as a breach of duty to take
affirmative steps to prevent its continuance . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314 cmt. d (1965). For example, failure to blow a train whistle when
necessary would be misfeasance though no action was taken; it would be
considered negligent operation of a train. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56,
at 374.
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25

through inaction.
Misfeasance, clearly involving a voluntary
undertaking, understandably gave rise to liability much more often
26
than nonfeasance. When a person enters into a relationship with
another, however, the creation of that relationship itself is a
voluntary undertaking, and this undertaking was deemed, in some
27
Thus,
situations, to give rise to liability for nonfeasance.
misfeasance and sometimes nonfeasance constitute grounds for the
modern negligence action.
B. Origin of Duty Element in Negligence
A negligence claim contains four elements: duty, breach of
28
duty, proximate cause, and actual loss or damage. Duty is the first
element of negligence. If there is no duty, there is no need to
29
Thus, duty acts as
inquire further into the other elements.
30
gatekeeper, limiting or expanding the scope of negligence claims.
In early tort law, “[t]he defendant’s obligation to behave
properly apparently was owed to all the world, and he was liable to any
31
The
person whom he might injure by his misconduct.”
negligence claim, however, developed with more limitations than
32
the intentional tort did. It is famously stated that “[n]egligence in
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 373. Justice Cardozo distinguished
between misfeasance and nonfeasance explaining, “The query always is whether
the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force
or instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to
become an instrument for good.” H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159
N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928).
26. “The courts were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of
misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even
though another might suffer harm because of his omission to act.” KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 56, at 373.
27. Describing nonfeasance, Harper noted, “[I]f he is in some relationship
with others by reason of some anterior voluntary act, he must, if the relationship is
of a certain kind, take active precautions to avoid harm to others.” HARPER, supra
note 15, § 66, at 154.
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 30, at 164-65.
29. HARPER, supra note 15, § 68, at 157. Whether a special relationship
creates a duty is a threshold question in Minnesota. See Errico v. Southland Corp.,
509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
30. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER,
JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.1, at 750 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2007) (1956).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 357 (emphasis added).
32. “The period during which [duty] developed was that of the [I]ndustrial
[R]evolution, and there is good reason to believe that it was a means by which the
courts sought, perhaps more or less unconsciously, to limit the responsibilities of
growing industry within some reasonable bounds.” Id.
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33

the air, so to speak, will not do.” Negligence developed in the
context of relationships and voluntary undertakings giving rise to
34
liability, and those ideas permeate the duty requirement.
Generally, duty can be defined as “an obligation, to which the
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular
35
standard of conduct toward another.” Yet, many variations exist.
Somewhat cynical descriptions include: “There is a duty if the court
says there is a duty . . . . [D]uty is only a word with which we state
36
our conclusion that there is or is not to be liability . . . .” The
Restatement (Second) of Torts initially avoids the word duty and
describes the element this way: liability exists for “an invasion of an
interest of another, if: (a) the interest invaded is protected against
37
unintentional invasion . . . .” Prosser and Keeton warn “that ‘duty’
is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
38
plaintiff is entitled to protection.” They also conclude that “no
better general statement can be made than that the courts will find
a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it
39
and agree that it exists.”

33. Id. (quoting P.A. LANDON, POLLOCK’S LAW OF TORTS 468 (13th ed. 1920)).
34. See supra discussion in Part II.A.
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 356. Duty proved difficult to define
from the beginning. The first attempt in 1883 was cumbersome and broad:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (Eng.).
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting William L. Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). However, the word “duty”
is introduced later in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328A (1965). Commentators note that Prosser intended section 281 to be “only
a semantic, not a substantive variation” of the standard formula and that he
introduced section 328A “precisely for the purpose of harmonizing Section 281’s
formulation with the traditional four-part test.” John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin
C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 657, 673–74 (2001). In response, other scholars suggest that the duty
element is assumed; the “existence of a duty [is] the default position where a
defendant's ‘affirmative act’ or ‘conduct’ creates a risk of harm.” W. Jonathan
Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 695 (2008).
38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 53, at 358.
39. Id. at 359.
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C. No Duty to Protect
Despite an early emergence of liability for some types of
nonfeasance, 40 the law has long attempted to circumscribe it by
41
As stated in the
making liability the exception to the rule.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[t]he fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid
or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
42
action.” This “no-duty-to-protect” rule applies regardless of the
43
severity of the danger or the ease of the action and has led to
44
seemingly harsh results.
D. Exceptions: Special Relationships
As one would expect, exceptions to the no-duty-to-protect rule
have developed over time.
One exception arises where a
45
relationship between two people is deemed “special.” Just as duty
in the broader sense reflects public policy, the decision that certain
relationships should give rise to liability for nonfeasance reflects
46
And
“custom, public sentiment, and views of social policy.”
similar to the public callings that constituted the first undertakings
40. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
41. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 373 (citing LEON GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY, 62 (1930)) (“[T]he highly individualistic philosophy of the older
common law . . . shrank from converting the courts into an agency for forcing
men to help one another.”).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (emphasis added).
43. Id. cmt. c.
44. See id. (“The result of the rule has been a series of older decisions to the
effect that one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire peril, is under no legal
obligation to aid him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the
other drown.”); see also Andrew D. Kaplan, “Cash-ing Out:” Regulating Omissions,
Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67,
78 (2000) (describing the public outcry and subsequent legislation after a sevenyear-old girl was raped and murdered in a casino restroom while a friend of the
perpetrator merely looked on, did not report, and was not civilly or criminally
liable); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 423, 423 (1985) (describing the famous 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese,
who was stabbed repeatedly in the street while thirty-eight neighbors looked on,
and proposing civil and criminal liability for failure to aid). Minnesota, however,
does have a “Good Samaritan Law.” See MINN. STAT. § 604A.01, subdiv. 1 (2006)
(making a person’s failure to provide reasonable aid at the scene of an emergency
a petty misdemeanor if the person faces no risk in doing so).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). In Minnesota, a duty to
protect requires both a special relationship and foreseeability. See Erickson v.
Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168–69 (Minn. 1989).
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 374.
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47

giving rise to negligence liability, today’s special relationships also
48
reflect such an entrustment.
Relationships that give rise to a duty to protect fall into two
49
major categories outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and a
third type that Minnesota law describes as a special relationship
50
and so described here.
51
First, some relationships are “protective by nature.” This type
of special relationship arises generally from section 315(b) and
specifically from sections 320 and 314A of the Restatement (Second) of
52
Under section 315(b), there is a duty to control the
Torts.
conduct of a third party where a special relationship “exists
between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to
53
54
protection.” Section 320 expands upon this rule. Section 314A
provides a more general duty to “aid or protect” in several
situations: a common carrier has a duty toward its passengers, an
55
innkeeper toward guests, and a possessor of land toward invitees.
Lastly and most significant to the Bjerke case, section 314A(4) says
that “one who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes
the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the
56
other of his normal opportunities for protection has a . . . duty to the
47. See supra Part II.A.
48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 374 (explaining that nonfeasance
liability exists when there is “some definite relation between the parties, of such a
character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to act”).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315(b), 320 (1965).
50. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Other grounds for nonfeasance
liability exist but are outside the scope of this case note. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965) (stating that if the actor’s prior conduct creates a
situation of peril, the actor has a duty to protect another from the danger).
51. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 383 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 320 (1965)).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A, 315(b), 320 (1965).
53. Id. § 315(b).
54. Section 320 provides: “[O]ne who is required by law to take or who
voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive
the other of his normal power of self-protection . . . is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons . . . if the actor (a)
knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the
third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.” Id. § 320.
55. Id. § 314A. Additionally, the Restatement (Second) notes that an employer
has a similar duty to an employee. Id. cmt. a.
56. Section 314A reads “normal opportunities for protection,” while the
related section 320 refers to the “normal power of self-protection.” See id. §§ 314A,
320. While this difference in wording is slight, the word “self” adds a limitation
which is significant in Bjerke v. Johnson, where normal opportunities for protection
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57

other.”
The second category contains special relationships which are
“custodial in nature,” that is, where a custodian must protect others
58
Section 315(a)
from a dangerous person in his or her care.
provides that a special relationship may exist between the actor
(the person charged with liability for nonfeasance) and a third
party (person causing the injury) such that the relationship
“imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s
59
conduct.” Thus, the injured party has a claim against the actor
(essentially a non-actor) for failure to protect him or her from the
60
third party. This type of special relationship was not applicable in
Bjerke v. Johnson and therefore will not be discussed further in this
note.
The third category, referred to as a special relationship in
61
Minnesota, comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A:
[O]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration,
to render services to another which he should recognize
as necessary for the protection of a third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the
risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other

were at issue. The dissent stated, “For purposes of section 314A, . . . we are only
concerned with the availability of normal opportunities of self-protection, not
whether a child’s circumstances are conducive to being protected by another.”
Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 676 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, G. Barry, J.,
dissenting).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (emphasis added).
58. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56, at 383. For example, a parent must
protect others from a dangerous child, and an employer must protect others from
an employee. Id. at 384. Sometimes the two categories overlap. A prison, having
two prisoners in its charge, would be required to protect the first from the second,
and control the second to protect the first. See id. at 383–84.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965).
60. Specifically, a parent has a duty to control a child, a master must control a
servant, a possessor of land must control a licensee, and one who takes charge of a
person with dangerous propensities must control that person. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316–319 (1965).
61. E.g., Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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or the third person upon the undertaking. 62
This special relationship allows for the transference of liability
to someone who assumes a duty for another. In Bjerke v. Johnson,
the court of appeals applied this theory, but the supreme court’s
63
majority opinion did not. Therefore, this note includes limited
discussion of the section 324A special relationship.
Having laid out the three special relationship categories, the
Restatement notes that the list is not exclusive and that the law seems
to be “working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or
64
protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”
Additionally, it is important to note that even where a special
relationship arises, the duty created is only to act with reasonable
65
care.
E. Special Relationships in Minnesota
Minnesota generally follows the Restatement in the area of
liability for nonfeasance. The circumstances of the relationship
determine whether a duty exists, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court has found relatively few special relationships.
1.

Hospital and Patient Relationships

Some of the earliest cases in Minnesota recognizing a duty to
protect arose where patients were injured in hospitals. 66 In Sylvester
67
v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis, decided in 1952, an
intoxicated patient wandered into the plaintiff’s hospital room and
68
hit him in the abdomen near his healing appendectomy incision.
The court held the hospital liable, relying on the Restatement (First)
of Torts section 320, which imposes a duty to exercise reasonable
care on one who “‘voluntarily takes custody . . . such as to deprive
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
63. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added).
65. Id. cmt. e.
66. See, e.g., Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n of Duluth, 194 Minn. 198, 259
N.W. 819 (1935) (recognizing duty of reasonable care by hospital to patient where
patient jumped from second-story window but finding insufficient evidence on
issue of foreseeability); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minn.
Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. Am., 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920)
(recognizing duty of reasonable care by hospital to pneumonia patient who fell
from second-story window).
67. 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952).
68. Id. at 385–86, 53 N.W.2d at 18.
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the other of his normal power of self-protection’” provided that the
actor knows or should know of his ability to control the third party
69
and of the need to do so. While the court noted that a private
hospital doesn’t ensure its patients’ safety, it added that the duty of
reasonable care “must always be in proportion to the patient’s
70
inability to look after his own safety.” Thus, the court emphasized
that the duty to protect hinged on the patient’s lack of ability to
protect himself, provided the hospital could control the third party.
2.

Voluntary Undertaking or Assumption of Duty

1979 brought three important special-relationship decisions by
the Minnesota Supreme Court. First, the court decided Cracraft v.
71
City of St. Louis Park. The plaintiff alleged that the city was liable
72
for the negligent inspection of a building under its own fire code.
The court applied the common law special-relationship doctrine,
73
citing Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315, to the municipality
to determine whether it owed more than a mere “general” duty to
74
the public. A “special duty,” as the court described it, reflects “the
ancient doctrine that once a duty to act for the protection of others
is voluntarily assumed, due care must be exercised even though
75
there was no duty to act in the first instance.” The court found
that the purpose of the inspections was to protect “the interests of
76
the municipality as a whole” and not to protect individuals. Thus,
the city did not voluntarily undertake the protection of individuals
and therefore could not be liable under the special-relationship
77
exception to the “no-duty-to-protect” rule.
69. Id. at 387, 53 N.W.2d at 19 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 320
(1934)).
70. Id. at 386, 53 N.W.2d at 19.
71. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979).
72. Municipalities generally owe a duty to the public, but not to individuals.
Id. at 804. The purpose of building codes is to protect the public, but the codes
do not act as insurance by the government as to the buildings’ safety. Id. at 804
(quoting Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 223, 199
N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972)).
73. The sovereign-immunity defense had previously been abolished by the
legislature. Id. at 803.
74. Id. at 804–05.
75. Id. at 806.
76. Id. at 805.
77. The court, though finding no special relationship, laid out four factors it
would consider: actual knowledge of a danger, reasonable reliance on the city’s
conduct, a statute that “sets forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole,” and whether the city

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 7

2009]

BJERKE V. JOHNSON

725

Again in 1979, the court analyzed the duty of care in Walsh v.
78
Here, the defendant was a “fixed base
Pagra Air Taxi, Inc.
operator” employed by a municipal airport to provide various
79
airport services, including fire protection. A plane caught fire,
and employees attempted to put the fire out but could not access
their firefighting equipment because the building door housing
80
the equipment was damaged. As a result, the plane was heavily
81
damaged. The court stated that while the municipality had no
general duty to prevent harm to private property, it had voluntarily
undertaken the task by providing fire-protection equipment and
82
personnel. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A,
the court then held that the defendant, the “fixed base operator,”
had a duty of care because it had undertaken to perform the city’s
83
duty. This holding again emphasizes that a voluntary undertaking
can result in liability where none previously existed.
3.

Special Relationships under the Restatement

Just a few months later, the court had another opportunity to
address special relationships in Delgado v. Lohmar. 84 Here, a group
of grouse hunters entered private property without the landowner’s
consent. When the landowner approached the hunters to request
that they leave his property, one of the hunters in the group
85
The landowner
accidentally shot and blinded the landowner.
claimed that once the hunters saw him they had a duty to protect,
86
that is, to inform the others in their group of his presence. The
court stated the rule that there is generally no duty to protect, but
87
the exception is where a special relationship exists. Specifically, it
stated that special relationships exist between “parents and
children, masters and servants, possessors of land and licensees,
common carriers and their customers, or people who have custody

increased the risk of harm. Id. at 806–07.
78. 282 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. 1979).
79. Id. at 569.
80. Id. at 570.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 570–71 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965)).
84. 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979).
85. Id. at 481–82.
86. Id. at 483.
87. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965)).
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88

of a person with dangerous propensities.” Ultimately, the court
concluded that the parties were strangers and no special
89
relationship existed between them, but the Delgado case is cited
for having recognized and laid out the different types of special
90
relationships recognized in Minnesota.
4.

No Duty to Protect from Criminal Activity

In 1985, the court held in Pietila v. Congdon that a homeowner
does not have a duty to protect invitees from the criminal acts of
91
The court stated that “[a] criminal act such as
third persons.
murder or armed robbery committed by a person or persons
unknown is not an activity of the owner and does not constitute a
92
condition of the land.” Therefore, no special relationship existed
creating a duty for a homeowner to protect guests against criminal
acts by third parties.

88. Id. at 484 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
However, the Delgado case caused some confusion on the issue of special
relationships between parents and children. The decision did not distinguish
between types of special relationships—whether the parents have a duty to protect
their children or whether they have a duty to protect others from their children.
The facts of the Delgado case indicate that it only intended to recognize the latter
type, see id., which comes from Restatement (Second) of Torts section 316. The case
has subsequently been cited, however, as holding that a parent has a duty to
protect his or her child, which is not a Restatement special relationship. See
Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a
Christian Scientist mother whose son died of diabetes because the mother did not
believe in obtaining conventional medicine was in a special relationship with son).
However, subsequent cases indicate a growing recognition of a duty of parent to
child. See Foss v. Kincade, 746 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), review
granted, (recognizing that parents have a “paramount duty” to protect their
children, though not in special relationship context), Sunnarborg v. Howard, 581
N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that third party does not stand in
special relationship to child when parent is present because parent has
responsibility to protect).
89. The court still held the hunters liable, however, because of the danger of
using firearms while trespassing. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn.
1979).
90. The supreme court cited it in Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn.
2007), Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001), and Johnson v. State, 553
N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1996).
91. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1985) (holding that trustees
of home did not have special relationship with nurse who was killed in the home
by an unknown intruder).
92. Id. at 333.
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Entrustment, Policy and Unique Circumstances

In 1989, certain facts finally persuaded the court that a special
relationship existed, thereby creating a duty to protect from third
persons. In Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co., 93 a woman was raped in
94
a parking ramp monitored by a security firm. The court had to
decide whether the owners/operators of the parking ramp and its
95
security firm had a duty to protect her from criminal acts.
Recognizing the historic underpinnings of the special relationship,
the court defined it as “a situation where B has in some way
entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that
96
entrustment.” Furthermore, the harm to be prevented must be
one that the defendant is “in a position to protect against and
97
should be expected to protect against.” Though acknowledging a
general reluctance by courts to impose a duty on businesses to
protect customers from criminal acts, the court said that the
decision depends on the relationship of the parties and
98
foreseeability of the risk involved. “Ultimately, the question is one
99
of policy.” The court decided that the “general characteristics of a
parking ramp” create a “unique opportunity for criminals”; thus,
the owner and operator of the ramp owed the plaintiff a duty to
100
exercise reasonable care.
Next, the court explained why the security firm also owed the
plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care. The security firm that
patrolled the ramp undertook to perform a duty owed by the
101
owner/operator of the ramp to a third party (i.e., the plaintiff).
Thus, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, the
102
security firm also had a duty to the plaintiff.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989).
Id. at 166.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id. at 170–71.
Id.
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6. Custody and Normal Opportunities for Self-Protection – Section
314A(4)
In Harper v. Herman 103 in 1993, the court recognized an
additional special relationship, found in section 314A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which creates a duty in “persons who
have custody of another person under circumstances in which that
other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self104
The court found no such relationship where a
protection.”
twenty-year-old man, a social guest on a boat, dove off the side into
105
shallow water and sustained serious injuries. The boat owner had
no duty to warn or protect because he did not have custody of his
guest, nor was the guest deprived of normal opportunities for self106
The court noted that deprivation of normal
protection.
opportunities for self-protection means that “the plaintiff is
typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent
upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable
107
power over the plaintiff’s welfare.” Furthermore, “such relations
have often involved some existing or potential economic advantage
to the defendant” and therefore, “[f]airness . . . may require the
defendant to use his power to help the plaintiff, based upon the
plaintiff’s expectation of protection, which itself may be based
108
upon the defendant’s expectation of financial gain.”
In 1995, in Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of
109
the supreme court reiterated the Harper factors of
Duluth,
110
The court
vulnerability, dependency, and considerable power.
held that the YWCA did not have a duty to protect a female
resident who committed suicide on its premises because it had no
custody or control, there was no entrustment, it did not deprive her
of opportunities for self-protection, and it was not in a position to
111
protect the resident from committing suicide.
103. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993).
104. Id. at 474 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (using the phrase
“normal opportunities for protection”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 320 (1965) (using the term “self-protection”).
105. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 474 n.2 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374).
108. Id. (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374.)
109. 539 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 1995).
110. Id. at 792 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 56 at 374).
111. Id. at 793.
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In 1996, the court decided H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, in
which several small children reported sexual abuse to their trailer
park manager, who advised them to tell their parents and took no
112
The court found that there was no special
further action.
113
relationship. Specifically, it found no acceptance of entrustment
by the manager and noted that although the children were
vulnerable, the manager had neither custody nor daily control over
114
The court stated in dicta that, even if the manager did
them.
have custody or control, she did not deprive the children of
opportunities for self-protection; in fact, the children
demonstrated their ability to protect themselves by telling their
115
parents about the abuse weeks later.
In 1999, the court held in Gilbertson v. Leininger that
homeowners did not have a special relationship under section
314A with an adult social guest who stayed overnight and fell in
116
The question of liability
their home, sustaining serious injuries.
arose because the homeowners, believing the guest was still
intoxicated from the night before, did not obtain emergency care
117
The court found that the homeowners
until late the next day.
had no custody over their guest, the guest did not lack the
opportunity for self-protection, and the guest had no reason to
118
expect protection from her hosts.
Most recently, in 2007, the court had yet another opportunity
119
A
to address special relationships in Becker v. Mayo Foundation.
hospital was sued for failing to recognize and report child abuse of
120
The court found that no special relationship existed
an infant.
because the hospital did not accept custody of the infant while
treating her injuries, and it did not “exercise control over . . . [the
112. 552 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1996).
113. Id. at 708.
114. Id. at 708–09. The court also commented that “[a]n adult who does not
stand in a caretaking relationship with a child should not have thrust upon her an
ill-defined legal responsibility to take ‘some reasonable action’—as suggested by
the dissent—because the child chose to report mistreatment to her.” Id. at 709.
115. Id. The court also noted, “[W]e recognize a feeling of shame and fear
about telling their parents would be a natural reaction for the children, but we
decline to graft an exception to the common law rule of no duty simply because
the personal feelings of the victims might inhibit their taking care of themselves.”
Id.
116. 599 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn. 1999).
117. Id. at 129–30.
118. Id. at 131–32.
119. 737 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 2007).
120. Id. at 205.
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121

child’s] daily welfare”; the child’s parents held that role.
The
court further rejected a special relationship under section 314A
because though the infant was clearly vulnerable, she was not
“deprived of ordinary means of protection . . . because she never
122
had any such means.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has found few instances of
special relationships, but it has provided a multitude of factors that
would suggest a special relationship exists. To briefly review, the
factors suggesting a section 314A special relationship are primarily
custody or control over daily welfare and deprivation of power or
opportunity for self-protection. Additional supporting factors
include entrustment and acceptance, dependence, being in a
position to protect and being expected to protect, particular
vulnerability, considerable power over the plaintiff’s welfare,
financial gain, and unique circumstances. This conglomeration of
factors reflected the state of the section 314A special relationship in
Minnesota when the supreme court heard Bjerke v. Johnson.
III. THE BJERKE DECISION
A. Facts and Procedural History
Suzette Johnson owned and ran a horse farm called Island
123
Farm, where she lived with her male friend Kenneth Bohlman.
Johnson often invited teenagers to visit her farm to ride and learn
124
One of these children was Aja Bjerke, who was
about horses.
125
fourteen years old in 1997 on her first visit to Island Farm.
Bjerke continued to visit Island Farm for weekends and short
time periods, and soon she began to increase the length and
126
frequency of her stays. She spent the entire summers of 1998 and
1999 at the farm, and by the spring of 2000, she resided full-time
127
with Johnson and Bohlman.
Early in her stay, Bjerke and Bohlman entered into a sexual
128
The relationship was
relationship that lasted several years.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 213.
Id.
Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 664.
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consensual, and Bjerke attempted to hide the relationship from
Johnson because she “loved Bohlman and did not want him to get
129
Bjerke left Island Farm in 2001 at age eighteen
into trouble.”
and subsequently informed law enforcement about the sexual
130
relationship.
Bjerke then filed a negligence claim against Johnson for failing
131
Johnson moved for summary
to protect her from sexual abuse.
judgment on the grounds that she had no duty to protect Bjerke
from harm by a third person because no special relationship
132
existed between them.
The district court granted partial summary judgment, holding
that Johnson had no duty to protect, and then it certified the issues
133
The court of appeals reversed, finding a special
for appeal.
relationship giving rise to a duty to protect under Restatement
134
(Second) of Torts section 324A.
B. Majority Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’
decision, though on different grounds. 135 The court agreed that
Johnson had a special relationship with Bjerke and therefore a duty
to protect her, but it did not reach a majority decision regarding
136
Instead, the
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A.
supreme court found a special relationship under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 314A, the rule cited in Harper v. Herman: a
special relationship “arises when an individual, whether voluntarily
or as required by law, has ‘custody of another person under
circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal
137
opportunities of self-protection.’”
129. Id.
130. Id. Bohlman was convicted of criminal sexual conduct for his relationship
with Bjerke. See State v. Bohlman, No. A05-207, 2006 WL 915765, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 11, 2006).
131. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 663.
132. Id. at 663–64. Johnson also claimed assumption of the risk as an
affirmative defense to bar the negligence claim. Id.
133. Id. The district court also held that assumption of the risk did apply to
minors so as to bar the negligence claim. Id.
134. Bjerke v. Johnson, 727 N.W.2d 183, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on
other grounds, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007). The court of appeals also held that
Bjerke was not capable of assuming the risk prior to age sixteen. Id. at 195.
135. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 663.
136. Id. at 667.
137. Id. at 665 (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn.
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The court first analyzed the custody prong of the test and held
that Johnson had custody of Bjerke as a matter of law as early as the
summer of 1998 when Bjerke spent her first summer at Island
138
Farm. Although Johnson never obtained legal custody, the court
decided that she satisfied a non-legal definition of custody by
“accept[ing] entrustment of some level of care for Bjerke when
Bjerke stayed at Johnson’s home, at a location distant from her
139
The court pointed out that Johnson provided
parents’ home.”
room, board, and rules for Bjerke and thus had a “large degree of
control over Bjerke’s welfare, strongly indicating that there was a
140
special relationship between the two.”
Having satisfied the custody element, the court analyzed the
second prong of the test: whether Bjerke was “deprived of normal
141
opportunities of self-protection.” The court of appeals held that
Bjerke’s opportunities for self-protection were the same in
Johnson’s custody as in her parents’ custody; therefore, she was not
142
The supreme court rejected this idea, stating
deprived of them.
143
that a child’s “primary source of protection” is her parents.
Bjerke, a minor, was living away from her parents under the daily
care and supervision of Johnson, and the court found that this
created a “substantial” deprivation of normal opportunities for
144
protection. Furthermore, the court noted that Bjerke need only
have lost normal opportunities for protection; it was not necessary
145
that she lose all protection.
The majority also addressed the potential disconnect between
its decision in H.B. and its decision in Bjerke. Because the H.B.
court did not find the requisite custody, its comment that the
young children were capable of self-protection because they could
146
Moreover,
tell their parents about their abuse was “mere dicta.”
Bjerke’s situation involved “special considerations” not existent in
147
H.B. First, she lived away from her parents, her normal source of

1993)).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007)).
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 667 n.3.
Id. at 667.
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148

protection, while she was abused.
Second, she lived with her
abuser, where she would be under pressure not to report the
149
abuse.
Thus, the court concluded that Bjerke was sufficiently
distinguishable from H.B.
Persuaded on both custody and lack of opportunity for selfprotection, the majority held that a section 314A special
150
relationship existed between Bjerke and Johnson. If Bjerke could
show that the harm was foreseeable, then Johnson had a duty
151
No holding was issued on whether a special
toward Bjerke.
152
relationship under section 324A existed.
C. Concurrence
Two justices concluded that a special relationship should exist
under section 324A in addition to section 314A of the Restatement
153
They argued that Johnson gratuitously
(Second) of Torts.
undertook to “render services to Bjerke’s parents . . . which [she]
should have recognized as being necessary for Bjerke’s
154
protection,” that she undertook a duty owed by Bjerke’s parents
to Bjerke, and finally that the parents relied on Johnson’s
155
undertaking.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
foreseeability, which precluded summary judgment. Id. at 668. The evidence
showed that Johnson and others had noticed “unusual and intimate behavior”
between Bohlman and Bjerke over the course of Bjerke’s stay at Island Farm. Id. at
668–69.
152. Id. at 667.
153. Id. at 671 (Hanson, J., concurring).
154. Id. The justices rejected Johnson’s argument that the word “undertaking”
required explicit agreement between Bjerke’s parents and Johnson, relying on the
common meaning of the term and the court’s decision in Erickson, 447 N.W.2d
165 (Minn. 1989), where no explicit agreement was found. Id. at 672. The
concurrence also argued that making an adult’s responsibility to a child rest solely
on the adult’s explicit agreement with the child’s parents would violate public
policy. Id. at 674. It would create a “dead zone” where the “custodian, who was in
the best position to care for the child, would have no duty to do so, while the
parents, who were too distant to actually care for the day to day needs of the child,
would retain the duty to do so.” Id. The duties of parents and custodians are not
“mutually exclusive, but can be shared and overlap.” Id. The concurrence
satisfied the final prong of section 324A by arguing that Johnson both undertook a
duty owed to Bjerke by her parents, and that the harm was suffered because
Bjerke’s parents relied on Johnson. Id. at 675.
155. Id. at 674.
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D. Dissent
According to the dissent, no special relationship existed under
sections 314A or 324A, and the Bjerke case represents a “significant
expansion of third party liability.” 156 The dissent did not dispute
the custody issue, but questioned whether Bjerke was deprived of
opportunities for self-protection. The dissent focused on the H.B.
decision, where small children reported sex abuse to their trailer
157
In H.B. the court concluded that the children
park manager.
were capable of self-protection because they actually protected
158
If these small
themselves by telling their parents of the abuse.
children were capable of self-protection, the dissent argued, Bjerke
159
certainly was. The dissent also rejected the majority’s conclusion
that because Bjerke was living in the same household as her abuser
160
she was less able to protect herself than the children in H.B.
Finally, the dissent argued that “for purposes of section 314A,
however, we are only concerned with the availability of normal
opportunities of self-protection, not whether the child’s
161
circumstances are conducive to being protected by another.”
The dissent also analyzed section 324A. It noted that the
162
Since
scope of the undertaking limits the scope of the duty.
Johnson did not undertake to protect Bjerke from third parties, she
163
could not have had a duty to do so. The dissent also argued that
public policy requires that courts exercise restraint in transferring
164
“A parent’s abdication of his or her parental
parental rights.
duties does not effectuate the transfer of those duties to
165
The dissenting justices further argued that even if
another.”
protection of Bjerke was within the scope of Johnson’s
undertaking, the case did not satisfy the other elements of section
166
324A.
156. Id. at 681 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).
157. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
158. Id. at 709.
159. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 676 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 676 n.11 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 677.
163. Id. at 678.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. They argued that Johnson’s failure to intervene did not increase the risk
of harm under 324A(a), that she did not undertake a duty owed to Bjerke by her
parents under 324A(b), and that the harm to Bjerke was not caused by her
parents’ reliance on Johnson under 324A(c). See id. at 678–81.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Bjerke case involved offensive behavior on the part of two
adults. Not only was there sexual abuse of a minor by Bohlman,
there was evidence suggesting that Johnson accepted Bjerke into
167
her home to give her a “more stable environment” and then
closed her eyes when she suspected an inappropriate relationship
168
between Bohlman and Bjerke.
However, our common law tradition does not easily
accommodate the creation of a duty in one person to protect
169
another. The Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota compared with a majority of
170
other states. Yet the decision is solidly grounded in the supreme
171
However, there
court’s prior holdings on special relationships.
are outstanding questions about how the Bjerke decision will be
applied, especially with regard to the relationship between the
custodian of the child and the child’s parents. The answers to
these questions will determine the extent of the expansion of
172
The decision is also
nonfeasance liability in Minnesota.
consistent with the trends and predictions for nonfeasance liability
given by commentators and reflected in the latest draft of the
173
Restatement (Third) of Torts.
A. Significant Expansion of Nonfeasance Liability in Minnesota
Over the last few decades, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rarely found that special relationships gave rise to a duty to protect.
Instead, it had emphasized the narrowness of the exceptions
allowed under Minnesota law. The majority in H.B. rejected the
174
dissent’s basis for liability, stating that it did not “even remotely
167. Id. at 664 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 668–69.
169. See supra Part II.C–E.
170. See infra Part IV.A–B.
171. See infra Part IV.C.
172. See infra Part IV.D.
173. See infra Part IV.E.
174. The dissent stated: “[W]hile we may not be our brother’s keeper, in a
civilized society, I believe it appropriate that the law recognize that we may be our
children’s keeper.” H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.
1996) (Gardebring, J., dissenting). The dissent would have concluded that the
trailer park manager had a duty under the Erickson decision based on unique
circumstances: because the abuse was reported to the manager, the children could
not protect themselves, state policy protected children from sexual abuse, and a
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fall[] within the parameters this court has carefully carved out as
the outer boundaries for this exception to the common law rule”
175
that there is no general duty to protect.
Prior to Bjerke, the court had not found any cases persuasive on
both the custody factor and the lack of opportunity for selfprotection factor under section 314A(4). As discussed earlier, the
court repeatedly rejected special relationships where the plaintiff
176
was a guest in the home or on the property of the defendants.
The court had rejected a special relationship where the protection
177
The court
of small children from sexual predators was at issue.
had also rejected a homeowner’s duty to protect against unknown
178
criminal intruders.
Until Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not recognized
179
Special
a special relationship between two private individuals.
relationships only existed between certain businesses and
180
181
individuals, hospitals and patients, innkeepers and guests, and
182
common carriers and passengers.
The Bjerke decision expanded
nonfeasance liability into the realm of private citizens, specifically
to custodians of minor guests using section 314A(4).
B. Application of Section 314A(4) Outside of Minnesota
Few other state supreme courts have recognized a section
314A(4) special relationship similar to that in Bjerke, making this
decision a significant expansion of nonfeasance liability on the
national scene, as well as in Minnesota.
To create a special relationship under section 314A(4), one
statute required a trailer park manager be on duty to respond to emergencies. Id.
175. Id. at 709 (majority opinion).
176. See Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999); Harper v.
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993).
177. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
178. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1985).
179. However, appellate level cases had done so. See Laska v. Anoka County,
696 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that daughter of day care
operator who had accepted entrustment of children had special relationship with
infant who died of SIDS while at the daycare); Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d
807, 820–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where the child of a Christian
Scientist mother died for lack of conventional medical treatment, the stepfather
and the Christian Scientist nurse hired by the mother were in a special
relationship with the child).
180. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1989).
181. Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17
(1952).
182. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993).
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must take “the custody of another under circumstances such as to
183
deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection.”
Since custody must exist before the second element is analyzed,
custody is often examined in more detail than is the second
element, deprivation of opportunities for protection.
1.

Custody or Control

In Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that
custody can take on an informal and common-language meaning.
Relying on the Random House Dictionary definition, “keeping;
184
guardianship; care,” the court found that Johnson took custody
of Bjerke when she began living at Island Farm full-time for a
185
summer.
Though custody has not been consistently defined
across the United States, the Bjerke definition is significantly
broader than what most other state high courts have adopted.
One of the most common applications of section 314A(4) is in
the relationship between a prison and an inmate. Formal legal
custody exists in a prison setting, so it is well settled that the prison
must protect inmates during their confinement, even from
186
Custody has also been expanded to include traffic
suicide.
187
When a police officer has stopped a person on the
stops.
183.
184.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965) (emphasis added).
Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 665 n.2 (Minn. 2007) (citing RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 494 (2nd ed. 1987). But cf. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 412 (8th ed. 2004) (defining custody as “care and control of a
thing or person for inspection, preservation, or security”).
185. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 665.
186. See Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 466–67 (Alaska 2001) (holding jailors
have duty to protect against foreseeable harm, including suicide, due to custodial
relationship with prisoner); Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind.
1998) (holding prison has duty toward prisoner in its custody, though not an
insurer of the prisoner’s safety); cf. C.J.W. ex rel. L.W. v. State, 853 P.2d 4, 11–12
(Kan. 1993) (recognizing custodial relationship between county juvenile hall and
juvenile inmate); Hickey v. Zezulka, 487 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Mich. 1992) (finding
custody where decedent was kept in a university holding cell awaiting transfer to
county jail).
187. Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989). In Kaisner a police officer
pulled over a driver onto the roadside, and another car hit the police car causing
injury to the driver. Id. at 733. The court defined custody as the “detainer of a
man's person by virtue of lawful process or authority.” Id. at 734 (citing BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979)). “The term is very elastic and may mean
actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of
imprisoning or of taking manual possession.” Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
347 (5th ed. 1979)). The petitioner was not free to leave the area without
becoming subject to criminal charges, therefore the relationship was custodial. Id.
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roadside, the driver’s liberty is restrained. Even though the driver
is not formally under arrest, he is not free to go. Thus, a special
relationship may exist between the officer and the driver and even
188
between the officer and the passengers in the vehicle.
Courts have found hospitals and institutions to have custody of
189
When patients are
mentally ill or handicapped patients.
involuntarily committed, a custodial relationship may exist
subjecting the hospital or institution to liability for failure to
190
protect.
In addition, schools often have custody over students. Courts
have viewed a school or school district as standing in loco parentis, in
191
By
the place of the parents, while children are at school.
mandating school attendance, a “state usurps a parent’s protective
custody of his or her child, replacing it with that of school teachers
192
Historically, the relationship between
and administrators.”
universities and their students was considered in loco parentis as well
193
Today, however,
because students were viewed as minors.
188. Id. However, no custody was found where a police officer stopped a
woman on suspicion of drunk driving but did not arrest her. Nelson v. Driscoll,
983 P.2d 972, 981 (Mont. 1999). Rather, the officer suggested she walk home or
get a ride, and she was killed by another driver as she walked home. Id. at 975–76.
The court stated that custody “contemplate[s] a degree of control akin to
possession, or a degree of control which results in a physical or legal restraint on
one's liberty,” and it found that depriving Nelson of her ability to drive home did
not place her in the officer’s custody. Id. at 981.
189. See DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr. Inc., 695 P.2d 255, 260
(Ariz. 1985) (noting that institution caring for “mental hold” patient had custody
of patient for purposes of section 314A); Hofflander v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc.,
664 N.W.2d 545, 572 (Wis. 2003) (holding that custody existed where a hospital
assumed “enhanced responsibility to protect a vulnerable, mentally disabled
person” as the hospital had more control over patient in psychiatric ward than
other patients).
190. See In re T.W., 126 P.3d 491, 500 (Mont. 2005) (Leaphart, J., dissenting)
(noting that woman with mental disabilities who was involuntarily committed to
the Montana Developmental Center was indisputably within the custody of the
center).
191. E.g. Doe Parents No. 1 v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 591 (Haw.
2002).
192. Id. See also McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362
(Wash. 1953) (stating that relationship between school and child is not voluntary
and the “protective custody of teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parent”).
193. See Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 774 (Kan. 1993); see also
Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 911 (Utah 2005) (noting “. . . the
fundamental reality that despite the relative developmental maturity of a college
student compared to, say, a pre-schooler, a college student will inevitably
relinquish a measure of behavioral autonomy to an instructor . . . .”).
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university students are generally viewed as adults and therefore not
194
in the custody of universities.
Outside of these commonly accepted custodial relationships,
state high courts have found the possibility of custody in a few
outlying situations. Though none appear to have expanded
custody quite to the level that Bjerke did, these decisions approach
the Bjerke definition.
In two cases, the court found custody of minors in summer
school programs which were voluntary, not statutorily mandated.
In Graham v. Montana State University, a high school student
attended a camp at a university and was injured in a motorcycle
195
The court concluded that, although the
accident there.
university did not have custody of its adult students, taking in a
minor created a custodial relationship analogous to that of any
196
school and its minor students. Additionally, in Brown v. Knight, a
four-year-old child was injured when she fell into a fire pit while
197
The
playing at a park during a summer school program.
Massachusetts court held that the child was in the custody of the
198
proprietress of the program. Both courts concluded that custody
existed where the defendants had taken charge of minors. Brown
199
emphasized that payment was relevant. Graham emphasized the
similarity between the summer program and a high school
200
setting.
In contrast to the majority of cases recognizing custody
of students by a school, neither court required that the children be
compelled to participate in those programs.
In Erickson v. Lavielle, the South Dakota Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether two adults who joined a group of
children for a pontoon ride on the lake for a few hours assumed a
201
section 314A(4) duty toward the children. The court determined
194. See Nero, 861 P.2d at 774. However, special relationships can still be
formed between universities and students in some situations. See Webb, 125 P.3d at
911.
195. Graham v. Mont. State Univ., 767 P.2d 301 (Mont. 1988).
196. Id. at 303–-04. Though the court found custody, and therefore a duty, the
plaintiff failed to show proximate cause. Id. at 304.
197. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Mass. 1972).
198. Id. at 792 (“[I]n taking for pay custody of Susan, a child unable to care for
herself, in place of her parents or regular guardians, the defendant had an
onerous duty to protect Susan from foreseeable harm, including a duty to take
affirmative protective acts . . . .”).
199. Id.
200. Graham, 767 P.2d at 303–04.
201. Erickson v. Lavielle, 368 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985).
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that it was a question for the jury and reversed summary
202
judgment, holding the door open for a factual finding of custody
in this situation.
In light of the scarcity of decisions with a similar definition of
203
custody, the Bjerke court appears to be breaking new ground. Yet
as we have seen, it is not completely alone in extending custody
beyond its well-accepted applications, especially where minors are
204
concerned.
2.

Deprivation of Normal Opportunities for Protection

Once custody is established under section 314A(4), a court
determines whether custody was taken “under circumstances such
as to deprive [a person] of his normal opportunities for
205
In many decisions, the second element is simply
protection.”
implied, but in other cases, like Bjerke, the court offers a substantial
explanation for the second element. The common applications of
the second element closely align with applications of the first
element. Specifically, prisoners and school children are often
206
found to be deprived of the opportunity to protect themselves.
The Bjerke court held that Bjerke was deprived of her normal
202. Id. at 627.
203. It is useful to note cases where courts held that there was no custody. See,
e.g., Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity, 616 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa 2000)
(finding national chapter of a fraternity had no custodial relationship with an
adult member who died due to excessive alcohol consumption); D.W. v. Bliss, 112
P.3d 232 (Kan. 2005) (where husband was mentoring and having illegal sexual
relationship with a minor, inviting minor to the home and to other locations for
sexual activity, the wife had no custody or control over minor who did not live in
the home with husband and wife); Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Techs., Inc., 798 A.2d
587 (N.H. 2002) (holding that minor employee was not in custody of employer
because employment is voluntary, employer was not parental proxy, and
employment relationship not analogous to school/student relationship); In re
Rockweit v. Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1995) (holding that a family friend who
visited the family’s campsite and did not extinguish the campfire upon leaving did
not have any custody over child who fell into the firepit).
204. Some appellate courts have utilized a more expansive concept of custody.
A Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A illustration is based in part on a New
Jersey case where the court found that a grandmother who was babysitting her
grandchild had custody of the child, and therefore she was potentially liable for
the child’s injuries that occurred during her watch. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A illus. 7 (1965) (citing Barbarisi v. Caruso, 135 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1957)).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965) (noting lack of
ability to defend along with loss of protection from someone who would be likely
to offer protection occurs in both the prison and school settings).
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opportunities for self-protection because she was living away from
207
her parents and was dependent on Johnson.
This conclusion
represents a new and broader application of the second element of
section 314A(4). The decision essentially removes the common
requirement that the deprivation of protection be involuntary.
It is well settled that an inmate confined in a prison has lost
208
the ability to protect herself from at least some external factors.
The prisoner is unable to avoid certain dangerous places or
209
situations and has lost the potential protection of those who
210
In Joseph v. State, the court reasoned
might otherwise provide it.
that the “imprisonment has diminished the prisoners’ ability to
care for themselves or has limited the ability of others to help
211
Thus, the
prisoners avoid harm, including self-inflicted harm.”
prison setting involuntarily removes the prisoner’s ability to defend
herself and removes anyone else’s ability to protect the prisoner.
Schools also remove children from their parents’ protection,
212
However,
imposing on the school a duty toward the children.
“[t]he basic premise for this duty is that a child is compelled to
attend school so that the ‘protective custody of teachers is
213
mandatorily substituted for that of the parent.’” The deprivation
of normal opportunities for self-protection does not exist merely
because the children are in the care of the school. By mandating
207. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Minn. 2007).
208. Haworth v. State, 592 P.2d 820, 824–25 (Haw. 1979).
209. Id.
210. See Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 467 (Alaska 2001).
211. Id.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 cmt. b (1965) (“[A] child while
in school is deprived of the protection of his parents or guardian. Therefore, the
actor who takes custody . . . of [that] child is properly required to give him the
protection which the custody or the manner in which it is taken has deprived
him.”).
213. Williams v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Ky. 2003) (quoting
Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 529 (Ky. 2001)). See also Doe Parents No. 1 v.
State, Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 591 (Haw. 2002) (stating that due to statute
requiring school attendance, children were deprived “of the protection from
reasonably foreseeable harm that their parents normally provide”); Marquay v.
Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (noting that a major factor in the special
relationship between a school and student is that school attendance is required);
McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360, 362 (Wash. 1953)
(“[T]he relationship here in question is that of school district and school child. It
is not a voluntary relationship. The child is compelled to attend school. He must
yield obedience to school rules and discipline formulated and enforced pursuant
to statute. The result is that the protective custody of teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parent.”) (citation omitted).
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school attendance, the state essentially removes parents’ ability to
protect their children.
In both prisons and schools, those in custody are deprived of
opportunities for protection in part because others who might
protect them are prevented from doing so. Neither the child nor
the inmate is voluntarily in custody, and those that would normally
protect the child or inmate have not voluntarily relinquished their
ability to protect. That is not the case in Bjerke. Bjerke herself
voluntarily went to live with Johnson, and Bjerke’s parents
voluntarily relinquished their ability to protect their daughter by
not living in the same home. Though the Bjerke decision is
certainly a reasonable interpretation of section 314A(4), it
significantly expands the definition of “deprivation of
opportunities for self-protection.”
Under Bjerke, the word
“deprivation” no longer connotes an involuntary loss of rights;
214
rather it merely means a “lack” of opportunity for self-protection.
However, when courts decrease the importance of
involuntariness in the custody element, a corresponding decrease
in involuntariness in the deprivation-of-protection element seems
to be the trend. As noted earlier in Graham, the court broadened
the custody element to the voluntary summer program for high
215
consequently broadening the
school students at a college,
deprivation-of-protection element as well. In Brown, when the child
was in a summer school program at the park, the court similarly
216
broadened the deprivation-of-protection element.
The Bjerke
case seems to reflect the same trend. When the definition of
custody is broadened, deprivation of opportunities for selfprotection follows.
C. Bjerke Decision Grounded in Prior Minnesota Decisions
Over the last few decades, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rarely found special relationships giving rise to a duty to protect—
217
under section 314A(4) or otherwise. Yet, as the court explained
in each case why a special relationship did not exist, it provided
218
Thus, while the
criteria that would signal a special relationship.
214. In fact, the Bjerke court used the term “lack” in place of “deprivation” in
three instances. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 666–67 (Minn. 2007).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 195–96, 200.
216. Brown v. Knight, 285 N.E.2d 790, 791--92 (Mass. 1972).
217. See cases cited infra notes 219, 226. But see case cited infra note 223.
218. See cases cited infra notes 219, 223, 226.
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Bjerke decision represents a significant expansion of nonfeasance
liability under section 314A(4) in Minnesota, it is not inconsistent
with the reasoning of cases leading up to Bjerke.
To briefly review, the court had set out multiple criteria
219
signaling a section 314A special relationship. Custody or control
220
over welfare or “daily welfare,” along with deprivation of “normal
221
or “normal powers of selfopportunities for protection”
protection,” are required for a section 314A(4) relationship.
Factors signaling deprivation of normal opportunities for
protection include particular vulnerability, dependence, and
222
considerable power held by the actor over another. Entrustment
223
When
is important to special relationships generally.
224
entrustment exists, acceptance of entrustment is required.
Additionally, whether an actor is in a position to assist and should
225
Finally, the court has
be expected to assist is important.
226
recognized that duty is ultimately a question of policy, and
227
sometimes special or unique circumstances create a duty.
1.

Custody or Control over Daily Welfare

Until Bjerke, the Minnesota Supreme Court was not presented
with facts that were persuasive on the custody issue. 228 Several
significant facts make Bjerke persuasive when prior cases were not.
As a minor, Bjerke resided with Johnson in her home for a
229
Though not explicitly stated, the
substantial amount of time.
court may have distinguished between guests and live-in residents
219. The term “custody” comes from section 314A(4) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The term “control” was added through case law. See Becker v.
Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 212 (Minn. 2007); Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599
N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999); H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705,
708–09 (Minn. 1996); Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth,
539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995).
220. See Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; H.B., 552 N.W.2d at 709.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965).
222. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; Harper v.
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note
15, § 56, at 374).
223. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989).
224. See H.B., 552 N.W.2d at 708; Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
225. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
226. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2001);
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
227. See Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
228. See cases cited supra note 219.
229. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W. 2d 660, 663 (Minn. 2007).
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230

based on length of stay.
In comparison, the plaintiff in Harper
231
was an adult guest on a boat for one afternoon. In Gilbertson, the
232
plaintiff was an adult house-guest who stayed overnight. In H.B.,
the minor plaintiffs never resided with the defendant, nor did the
233
In Donaldson, the
injury occur on the defendant’s property.
234
plaintiff was an adult making a temporary residence at a YWCA.
In Becker, the infant patient briefly stayed in the hospital to receive
treatment for a particular problem; the hospital did not accept
235
Johnson, in contrast,
custody or take control over daily welfare.
provided room and board, established rules, required chores, and
236
had authorization to seek medical treatment for Bjerke. Because
prior case law allowed “control over daily welfare” to substitute for
237
custody, the facts in Bjerke support the court’s decision.
In short, because Bjerke resided for a substantial period of
time under Johnson’s care, the living arrangement more closely
resembled custody. The dissent did not even dispute the custody
issue; rather, it argued that the custody did not deprive Bjerke of
238
Although this decision
normal opportunities for self-protection.
significantly expanded the concept of custody, the court’s
definition of custody had been developing over time, and Bjerke
provided a significantly clearer showing of custody than prior cases.
2.

Deprivation of Normal Opportunities for Self-Protection

Under prior case law, deprivation of normal opportunities for
self-protection included additional factors: particular vulnerability,
dependence, and the defendant’s considerable power over the
239
The Bjerke case incorporates these elements—some
plaintiff.
230. The court did not find custody when Bjerke stayed with Johnson for short
time periods, weekends, and even two-and-one-half-week periods; custody began
when Bjerke resided with Johnson for a full summer. Id. at 665.
231. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 473 (Minn. 1993).
232. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999).
233. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1996).
234. Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789,
792 (Minn. 1995).
235. Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007). In Becker the
court considered it critical that the injuries to the infant took place outside the
hospital. Id.
236. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 663–64 (Minn. 2007).
237. See cases cited supra note 220.
238. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 676 (Anderson, G. Barry, J., dissenting).
239. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213; Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; Harper v.
Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993) (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note
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indirectly—in its analysis. At first glance, Bjerke appears somewhat
inconsistent with prior cases applying this factor; however, it follows
the formula of section 314A adopted in prior cases, making the
deprivation of protection element secondary to the custody
element.
In describing deprivation of opportunities for protection, the
court applied the elements laid out in prior case law. The court
directly addressed dependence, stating that “[t]he natural
dependence which Bjerke would have had upon Johnson increased
240
as her stays at the farm became progressively longer.” The court
also indirectly addressed whether Johnson had considerable power
over Bjerke, linking that factor to the level of control Johnson had
241
The court did not directly address
over Bjerke’s daily welfare.
particular vulnerability, but it pointed out a “special
consideration[]” that Bjerke lived in the same household as
Bohlman when the abuse occurred, which could create extra
242
pressure not to report.
In addition, although the court’s decision on deprivation of
normal opportunities for self-protection appears at odds with prior
cases on point, it is consistent with the formula set out in section
314A. In H.B. the court stated that small children could protect
themselves because they could tell their parents about sexual
243
abuse. In Becker the court stated that the infant was not deprived
of the opportunity for self-protection because she had none to
244
But in Bjerke, the court stated that a high school
begin with.
student who voluntarily lived away from her parents did not have
normal opportunities for self-protection because her parents were
245
The outcomes are arguably
not there to observe her behaviors.
246
inconsistent based on the age and vulnerabilities of the plaintiffs.
Despite the differing outcomes, the Bjerke decision was
consistent with the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 314A(4) that appeared in prior cases. The lack of a self15, § 56 at 374).
240. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666.
241. Id. at 665.
242. Id. at 667.
243. H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1996).
244. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 213.
245. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666.
246. The dissent points out this discrepancy, stating that if the children in H.B.
were capable of self-protection, then Bjerke certainly was. Id. at 676 (Anderson, G.
Barry, J., dissenting).
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protection element is subordinate to the custody element, and it
247
Custody itself
need only be discussed where custody is found.
must create the circumstances which deprive a person of
opportunities for self-protection in order to form a special
relationship. Custody did not deprive the children in H.B. of
anything, nor did custody deprive the infant in Becker of any
protection. The custody arrangement did place Bjerke away from
248
Whether the distance between
her parents’ daily observation.
parent and child sufficiently deprived Bjerke of the protection
necessary to satisfy the requirement was a matter of dispute
between the majority and the dissent. However, the Bjerke holding
clearly applied the two elements of section 314A(4) in their proper
order, the second dependent on the first, and therefore the
decision is not inconsistent with H.B. or Becker where no custody
was found.
3.

Entrustment and Acceptance

The Bjerke decision also followed Erickson, pointing out that
Bjerke’s parents entrusted Johnson with custody and that Johnson
249
accepted that entrustment when she took Bjerke into her home.
But like the Erickson decision, the court did not elaborate on
entrustment. It also declined to comment on whether Johnson was
in a position to assist Bjerke or whether she should have been
250
expected to, a rule that came out of the Erickson decision.
4.

Public Policy

Noticeably absent in the Bjerke decision on whether a special
relationship existed was a discussion of public policy. 251 Policy was a
major consideration in several prior cases where the courts asked
whether a defendant should be required to protect the plaintiff
from criminal acts. Because crime prevention is primarily a
252
government function, transferring it to a private party is a
247. Id. at 667 n.3 (majority opinion) (noting that when no custodial
relationship exists any analysis of duty is dicta).
248. Id. at 666.
249. Id. at 665.
250. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989).
251. The court does address public policy later in the decision where it holds
that primary assumption of the risk is not a defense for Johnson. See Bjerke, 742
N.W.2d at 670.
252. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 n.4 (Minn. 2001);
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significant policy consideration. However, the Bjerke situation is
distinguishable from the prior cases because the criminal was not a
stranger, and, therefore, creating a duty to protect was justifiable
on policy grounds.
In Pietila the court rhetorically asked, “[H]ow can one know
what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the
degenerate, the psychopath, and the psychotic? Must the owner
253
In Funchess, the court noted that “criminals
prevent all crime?”
254
In
are unpredictable and bent on defeating security measures.”
both cases, the court held there was no duty to protect against
255
However, in Erickson the court took note of the
criminals.
inherent problem of a “duty to contain a slippery criminal” but
held instead that the parking ramp presented such a “unique
256
opportunity” for criminal activity that it justified a duty.
The Bjerke case is distinguishable in that a stranger did not
commit the criminal acts. A member of the household, a person in
an intimate relationship with both Johnson and Bjerke, committed
the acts. While it may be impossible to predict a criminal break-in,
it is possible to see signs of an inappropriate relationship occurring
in one’s home and predict the harm that will come of it. Thus, the
policy argument applied in prior cases against a duty to protect
from unknown criminals is obviated when confronted with the
situation in Bjerke.
D. Unanswered Questions: The Presence or Absence of Parents
The duty to protect based on a special relationship is
fundamentally grounded in the nature of the relationship itself.
When the relationship is between a child and a custodian, the
custodian’s relationship with the parents may be irrelevant unless it
257
enters through other means, as it did in Bjerke. The court found
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
253. Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985).
254. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 673 n.4 (denying a special relationship duty to
protect between landlord and tenant).
255. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 675; Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333.
256. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169. The dissent in H.B. would follow the Erickson
lead and recognize special circumstances justifying a duty to protect in light of the
public policy of protecting children against child abuse. H.B. ex rel. Clark v.
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1996) (Gardenbring, J., dissenting).
257. For example, under a common carrier/passenger special relationship
where a child is a passenger on a train, the relationship between the parent and
the child or between the parent and the railroad company is irrelevant; the child is
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258

that a child’s “primary source of protection” is her parents, and,
when parent and child live together, the parent “is more able” to
259
The court
observe behavior that would indicate abuse.
concluded that, because Bjerke and her parents lived apart, her
parents could not effectively make such observations, and thus
260
Bjerke was deprived of normal opportunities for self-protection.
The Bjerke decision raises questions which will need to be addressed
as the courts apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A to
caretaker/child relationships. The answers to these questions will
determine the extent of the expansion in nonfeasance liability
created by the Bjerke decision.
Two alternative interpretations arise from Bjerke, each
generating its own subsequent problem. First, the court made no
real inquiry into the level of oversight Bjerke’s parents had while
living apart from her, which may indicate that the court believes
that any absence from parents is a deprivation of opportunities for
self-protection. This would greatly expand liability for nonfeasance
in a custodial relationship. Second, if the court were to analyze the
factual situation to determine whether the parents had sufficient
oversight while living apart, then the presence or absence of the
parents’ oversight, a factor outside the control of the custodian,
261
could affect the custodian’s liability.
Considering the first issue, if the court believes that any child
living apart from parents is deprived of normal opportunities for
self-protection, then liability could be greatly expanded. Courts
may even charge a custodian with a duty to protect against harm
that the parents may not have been able to prevent.
The Bjerke case is a good example of a situation where one
could reasonably conclude that a child’s parents could not have
protected her even if she had lived in their home. First, Bjerke
never lacked the ability or the opportunity to tell anyone, including
262
She talked to her parents
her parents, about her relationship.
in a special relationship with the railroad company because of his or her status as
passenger. See Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 674 (Minn. 2007) (Hanson, J.,
concurring).
258. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965) (creating a duty to
protect based on the relationship between one who “undertakes . . . to render
services to another . . . necessary for the protection of a third person . . .” and the
receiver of those services).
262. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666.
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regularly on the telephone and frequently contacted them while
263
She intentionally kept the relationship a
living with Johnson.
264
secret because she wanted it to continue. In addition, Bjerke was
265
not forced to go to or remain at the farm, nor was she forced to
266
enter into the relationship with Bohlman.
Finally, no cited
evidence indicated that Bjerke’s parents would have observed any
behavioral changes in her if she had lived with them.
If a court concludes that living away from parents
automatically equals deprivation of opportunities for selfprotection, then a custodian may be liable for what the parents
could not have prevented. If the parents could not prevent the
harm, then arguably no actual deprivation of opportunity for selfprotection would occur. Hence, negligence liability would turn on
267
deprivation in theory rather than actual deprivation.
Considering the second issue, if liability depends on the level
of the parents’ actual oversight of their child while living apart,
then the custodian’s liability could depend on the parents’
relationship to the child, which runs contrary to the rule that the
special relationship itself creates liability. For example, when
parents are heavily involved in their child’s daily life by monitoring
and observing her behavior via frequent visits, telephone calls, and
e-mail, the likelihood that they will observe a change in behavior
increases. Even if they do not observe a behavior change, the
opportunity to do so exists. The child’s normal opportunities for
self-protection, that is, her parents’ oversight, are not lost. It would
follow then, that a parent who abdicates all oversight over the child
creates a duty to protect in the custodian, while a parent who
maintains a great deal of oversight relieves the custodian of a duty
to protect. A caretaker’s liability could then turn on the level of
oversight that the child’s parents choose to exercise. This would
263. Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 7, Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660
(Minn. 2007) (No. A06-0117).
264. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 664.
265. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 666–69. By her junior year, Bjerke had her driver’s
license and drove herself back and forth between Island Farm and school. See
Brief and Appendix of Appellant at 5, Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn.
2007) (No. A06-0117). She subsequently enrolled in post-secondary education at a
local college for her senior year of high school and thus had substantial
independence. Id.
266. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 664.
267. Compare to Becker, where the court held that the infant patient at the
Mayo clinic was not actually deprived of opportunities for protection because she
had none. Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 213 (Minn. 2007).
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produce a result unfair to the custodian, and it would conflict with
the special–relationship rule. The relationship must be between
the actor and the person in need of protection—here, the
custodian and the child.
Ultimately, the court’s emphasis on the idea that parental
oversight constitutes “normal opportunities for self-protection”
poses questions that future applications of the Bjerke decision must
address. The direction the court takes with these questions will
determine the true extent of the case’s expansion of nonfeasance
liability in Minnesota, especially with regard to the protection of
children.
E. Trend Toward Broader Liability for Nonfeasance and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts
Through the introduction of special relationships, the
exceptions to the no-duty-to-protect rule have been increasing, and
commentators have long noticed a trend toward the expansion of
268
liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts expanded the Restatement
(First) of Torts’ section on affirmative duty, listed specific special
relationships for the first time, and noted that the law appeared to
be “working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or
269
protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes even more special
relationships and predicts new ones appearing on the horizon.
The third installment of the Restatement (Third) of Torts is titled
270
“Liability for Physical Harm” and has substantially narrowed its
271
The structure differs
scope to negligence and related issues.
significantly from the first two Restatements in both numbering and
organization. In its current form, the Restatement (Third) of Torts
268. See, e.g., John M. Adler, Relying upon the Unreasonableness of Strangers: Some
Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect
Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 896–97 (noting the expansion of nonfeasance
liability in Michigan and New Jersey).
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965).
270. The first two installments, Products Liability and Apportionment of
Liability, were completed in 1998 and 2000 respectively. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM Introduction xli (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,
2005).
271. This installment does not cover products liability, intentional torts or
liability for non-physical harm such as invasion of privacy or damage to reputation,
all of which are either addressed in prior installments or still governed by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM Introduction xlii (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
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provides even more support for the Bjerke decision than did the
Restatement (Second).
First, one should note its organization. Chapter seven of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts covers affirmative duties. It begins by
rephrasing the no-duty rule and introducing the exceptions.
Section 37 states that “[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a
risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to the other
unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties
272
Next, the chapter lays out
provided in §§ 38–44 is applicable.”
the seven areas of affirmative duty, the exceptions to the no-duty
rule.
Of particular relevance to the Bjerke discussion is section 40,
titled “Duty Based on Special Relationship with Another.” Section
40 recognizes more special relationships than did the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and it changes the language of the section 314A(4)
273
custodial relationship applied in Bjerke. Section 40, part 7 reads:
(a) [A]n actor in a special relationship with another owes
the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks
that arise within the scope of the relationship.
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided
in Subsection (a) include:
...
(7) a custodian with those in its custody, if:
a) the custodian is required by law to take custody or
voluntarily takes custody of the other; and
b) the custodian has a superior ability to protect the
other. 274
By replacing the “deprivation of opportunities for protection”
language and requiring only that the custodian has “superior ability
to protect,” the Restatement (Third) of Torts appears to expand the
breadth of the custodial special relationship. Whether Johnson
had a superior ability to protect Bjerke may be particularly
272. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 37
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM, supra, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314
(1965) (“[T]he fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part
is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a
duty to take such action.”).
273. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40
cmt. n (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
274. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
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applicable in light of the injury. Where there is sexual abuse in the
275
home, the court noted, the child is pressured not to report.
Under the psychological pressure of sexual abuse and because of a
minor’s inability to understand the long-term harm, a court might
find that Johnson had a superior ability to report.
In addition, the comments and reporters’ notes to section 40
provide support for the Bjerke decision in that they loosen the
definition of custody to extend to more clearly voluntary
relationships than is currently the case. They also recognize
broader and more numerous special relationships than did the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes a broader
school/student special relationship, which was missing in the
Restatement (Second), and it bases the duty on custody and
276
It notes that the
replacement of the child’s parental protection.
school/student relationship includes students attending athletic
competitions and notes the disparity between courts on special
relationships between colleges and students, which have not
277
entirely gone away.
The comments and reporters’ notes provide examples of
additional special relationships, such as between a daycare and its
278
clients’ children, between camps and their campers, and between
279
a school bus driver and the bus’s riders.
This reflects a trend
toward broader definitions of custody and deprivation of
protection which will expand the special-relationship exception to
the no-duty rule.
Additionally, the Restatement (Third) of Torts notes that the
280
The reporters
special relationships listed are not exclusive.
predict that a likely addition to the special relationship list is the
relationship between family members, especially when they are
281
living together. The Restatement (Third)’s comments also note that
282
parents have a custodial duty toward their children, though thus
275. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007).
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. 1
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
277. Id.
278. Id. § 40 cmt. n.
279. Id. § 40 cmt. i (noting overlap between custodial relationships and those
between common carriers and passengers).
280. Id. at cmt. O.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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far the parent/child relationship has not been added to the list of
special relationships laid out in section 40. Again, the indication is
that the Restatement (Third) of Torts is recognizing an expansion of
liability based on special relationships.
While it remains to be seen how and when the new Restatement
(Third) of Torts special–relationship rule will be applied to a
custodial relationship, it represents a trend toward greater liability.
Based on the Bjerke decision, Minnesota may be at the forefront of
this trend.
V. CONCLUSION
American courts have historically been reluctant to create a
duty in one person to protect another, so the Bjerke decision
reflects a significant expansion of nonfeasance liability both in
Minnesota and across the country. However, the decision clearly
employs the special–relationship factors laid out in decisions
leading up to Bjerke and thus is consistent with prior Minnesota
common law.
The Bjerke decision does leave us with questions about how it
will be applied in the future. Does the court believe that any
separation between child and parents is a deprivation of
opportunity for self-protection? Alternatively, does the level of
parental oversight determine whether an opportunity for selfprotection is lost? Future courts may be asked to answer these
questions, and their answers will determine the scope of the Bjerke
decision.
Ultimately, the Bjerke decision represents what the Restatement
(Third) of Torts and commentators predict is a trend toward greater
nonfeasance liability through the exception of special
relationships. Bjerke nudged open the door to greater nonfeasance
liability in Minnesota. It broadened the definition of custody and
the concept of deprivation of opportunities for self-protection.
Now the courts must decide just how far that door has been
opened.
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